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Franjo Marković (1845-1914) was the first professor of philosophy at the restored 
University of Zagreb (1874). The manuscript of his Logic is kept at the Archives 
of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and consists of the autograph 
indexed as XV 37/1 and six lithographed copies (a-f), the most extensive of which 
is indexed as 2a (approximately 820 pages). The manuscript Logic can be said 
to consist of two parts: the first is an introduction and the second is entitled The 
System of Logic. The first part is further divided into seven sections, while the 
second part includes eleven sections. This article discusses the sixth section of 
the first (introductory) part, entitled Reasons against Absolute Logic (in 2a pp. 
94-119), in which Marković sets out his criticism of Hegel’s logic. First, the manu-
script Logic is described, and then, Marković’s two substantial objections to Hegel 
are considered: first, that it is not possible, starting from one concept (the most 
abstract one), which would be the beginning of all other concepts, to develop the 
wholeness of concepts (and at the same time the totality of the whole of everything 
that is) without the aid of thoughts acquired by perception; and second, that the 
procedure of absolute logic is in itself »illogical«, i.e. contrary to the irrefutable 
laws of logic. Finally, it is concluded that Marković’s criticism of Hegel’s logic, 
which is actually metaphysics, is made exclusively from a logical viewpoint, as 
he does not accept Hegel’s »transformation« of logic into metaphysics. Marković’s 
intent to »outline« his (philosophical) position on Hegel is particularly pointed 
out, since numerous opponents of Hegel’s philosophising, to whom Marković him-
self belongs, are generally reluctant to deal with Hegel’s philosophy.
Key words: anti-Hegelianism, Austrian realism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich He-
gel, logic, Franjo Marković.
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Introduction
The Archive1 of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb 
treasures the manuscript Logic by Croatian philosopher, classical philologist, 
writer, theatre and literary critic Franjo Marković (1845-1914). The manuscript 
consists of an autograph (very poorly legible) indexed as XV 37/1, and six litho-
graphed copies (a-f ), as XV 37/2, the longest of them indexed as 2a (compris-
ing approximately 820 pages). All the lithographed copies are quite legible. All 
contain Marković’s corrections, but they differ from each other with regard to 
the completeness and the quantity of included corrections. Most of the correc-
tions are to be found in copies a, b and c. All the corrections and additions are 
written by Marković in hand.2
Marković taught logic for 32 years, from 1875 (he held his first lecture on 18 
October) until 1907, holding lectures in cycles, at regular intervals of two or three 
years.3 When he started teaching logic, Marković must have already prepared his 
lectures and written them down in some form. However, he gradually expanded 
and complemented this basic or core form with various additions and insertions, 
which is clearly visible from his references to some works, including those pub-
lished after 1900. This is why these lectures grew longer with time and finally 
reached (approximately) the 820 pages of the manuscript mentioned above, with 
clear indications that Marković had intended to publish them. The manuscript 
Logic can be said to consist of two parts: the first part is an introduction and the 
second part is entitled The System of Logic. The first part is further divided into 
seven sections, while the second part includes eleven sections.
Although Marković expounded his critique of Hegel’s »absolute« logic 
in the sixth section (Reasons against absolute logic, pp. 94-119), which is thus 
the object of study of this article, a certain announcement of this critique can 
already be found in the fifth section of the introductory part. Here, Marković 
poses the question what is »the right direction of logic«, as he puts it, simultane-
ously providing the answer and saying that it is the one that »moves along the 
middle, between pure formal and completely real (or objective) logic«.4 In the 
fifth section, Marković thus strives to maintain this »middle« direction, or way, 
between completely formal and completely real logic, not siding with either of 
1 This is a significantly shorter and partly changed version of the text entitled Markovićeva kri-
tika Hegelove logike published in Rad Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 539, 2019, 
33-96.
2 For Franjo Marković’s manuscript legacy in general see Bojan MAROTTI, O Markovićevim 
filozofskim rukopisima u arhivima HAZU, Civitas Crisiensis, 2 (2016) 109-152; also see Bojan 
MAROTTI, Prema domovini misi, Zagreb, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 2019, 27-62.
3 See Ivan PEKLIĆ, Život i djelo Franje Markovića, Zagreb – Križevci, Hrvatska akademija 
znanosti i umjetnosti – Zavod za znanstveno-istraživački rad Koprivničko-križevačke županije u 
Križevcima, 2014, 49–54.
4 See lithographed copy 2a, 62. Only the page reference in brackets will be given further in the 
text.
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the two extremes.5 However much Marković cared to show »the justification« 
of such an understanding of logic, he tried perhaps even harder to warn of the 
totally unfounded status of Hegel’s approach and his notion of logic in general, as 
this »most rigorous representative of German idealism turns science into mere 
speculation, saying that concepts are the real beings of the world« (pp. 88-89).
In »announcing« his critique of Hegel, Marković explicitly mentions Adolf 
Trendelenburg’s well-known work Logische Untersuchungen,6 on which he re-
lies to a large degree. Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was professor of philos-
ophy in Berlin, but also a classical philologist. In 1874, Franz Brentano (1838-
1917), who attended Trendelenburg’s lectures in Berlin, was made professor of 
philosophy in Vienna. He took up his tenure on 22 April, and five days later, on 
27 April, Emperor Franz Joseph I appointed Franjo Marković as the first »full, 
public professor of theoretical and practical philosophy and history of philoso-
phy« at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb.7 Marković had earned 
his doctorate two years earlier, on 8 March 1872, also in Vienna,8 with Robert 
Zimmermann (1824-1898) as his supervisor, who was Brentano’s (senior) »col-
league« at the University. Although Brentano was well acquainted with the 
works of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), it was Marković’s »teacher« Robert Zim-
mermann, who belonged to so called »Bolzano’s circle« (Bolzanokreis).
Through Zimmermann, Marković was therefore indirectly connected with 
Bolzano, too, while, on the other hand, Brentano himself was indirectly linked 
to Bolzano’s philosophy. Thus, it can be said that in the background of the 
whole development of what is sometimes referred to as »Austrian philosophy« 
(as opposed to »philosophy in Austria«), or »Austrian realism«,9 is actually Ber-
nard Bolzano.
1. The fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy
But what does Marković’s critique of Hegel’s logic actually look like? The key 
question here, and when dealing with criticism of Hegel and his philosophy in 
general, is where to start. Or, in other words, from what standpoint is it possible 
to undertake this criticism? Where can a stronghold be found for a possible 
critical approach?
5 See Srećko KOVAČ, Formalizam i realizam u logici: Franjo pl. Marković i Gjuro Arnold, Prilozi 
za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, 18 (1992) 35-36, 141-182; cf. also Srećko KOVAČ, Logi-
ka u filozofiji Franje pl. Markovića, in: Stipe Kutleša (ur.), Filozofijsko djelo Franje pl. Markovića, 
Zagreb, Matica hrvatska, 2016, 57-73.
6 Marković uses the third edition of TRENDELENBURG’s Logische Untersuchungen (Bd. I–II, 
Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1870).
7 See details in Peklić, Život i djelo Franje Markovića…, 48.
8 Ibid., 23.
9 See for example the journal The Monist, 83, 1. This whole issue entitled Austrian Realism. From 
Aristotelian Roots to the Vienna Circle was dedicated to »Austrian philosophy«.
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In order to find such a stronghold, or to establish it somehow, in the first 
passage of section six of the introductory part of his Logic, Marković first en-
deavours to put Hegel’s approach to logic – or, better to say – Hegel’s phi-
losophy as a whole, rather Hegel’s understanding of everything there is, into 
a broader frame, that is, into the horizon of the history of philosophy. Thus, 
he presents a very concise account of the trend of philosophy to which, ac-
cording to his view, Hegel himself belongs. This leads him to the very begin-
nings of European philosophy, to Heraclitus (Ἡράκλειτος) and Parmenides 
(Παρμενίδης).10 After briefly outlining their basic claims, he moves on to Plato, 
for whom he claims that »he established a doctrine, which builds on those 
previous two mutually opposite ones« (p. 94). What Plato actually attempts 
to do, in Marković’s opinion, is »reconcile« or »bridge the gap between« those 
two opposing philosophies, Heraclitus’ on one hand, claiming that »the only 
constant and substantial thing in the world is eternal and perpetual change« 
(p. 94), and Parmenides’ philosophy, on the other hand, saying 
»that there is only one, eternal, unchangeable, non-material being, which itself 
has the true Being, and that all the individual material changeable things are 
mere passing appearances without a Being« (p. 94). 
Plato holds, according to Marković, that what has an unchangeable Being, 
what really is a being or »something«, cannot be material, for all that is material 
is in constant change. But non-material ideas exist »above« matter, and they are 
true beings, as they are invariable and eternal. This is so to the extent that every 
concept of ours, for example the concept of table, has its »arche-form« in an idea. 
Nevertheless, in this, the arche-form is not a mere thought, either of the human 
or divine mind (or spirit), but is an independent being, which »exists as a being 
beyond time in the space above the sky« (p. 95). Plato, Marković continues, has 
elevated our concepts to the level of beings, or substances, and »ὑπόστασις, sub-
stance, is the name for that being which stands and remains eternally under the 
appearing transient matter« (p. 96). By having been turned into beings, concepts 
have become »conceptualizations« (or »massive concepts«).
Then, Marković proceeds to medieval philosophy, specifically to scholasti-
cism. In this respect, he studies two strongly opposed views: nominalism and 
realism. Nominalists maintain, Marković claims, that only individual things 
have a Being, i.e. that that which is individual (or single), really is, and that con-
cepts are not beings, but that they are only our thoughts which are expressed 
through words, that is to say, that concepts are mere words. Realists, on the 
other hand, claim the opposite, namely that concepts are not mere thoughts 
(and even less so mere words), but they are beings, i.e. res (»things«). And here 
Marković took care to further intensify this contrast, in order to be able, after 
10 He actually refers to the »Eleatics« (p. 94).
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having discussed nominalism and realism, to present his main statement (p. 
97): 
»It is to Plato’s teaching that ideas or conceptualizations [or ‘massive concepts’, 
i.e. concepts made into beings] are true beings, and to scholastic realistic teach-
ing that concepts themselves are true things, res, i.e. beings, that Hegel’s teach-
ing on absolute logic connects«.
Accordingly, this direction in the history of philosophy, to which Hegel be-
longs, or can be linked, looks like this: Plato (and Neoplatonism) – medieval 
realism – Hegel. Because, according to Marković, for Hegel, the pure concept 
of a thing »that is its concept abstracted from all its sensory marks« (p. 97) is 
not only the essence (substance, or »beingness«), but the Being of that thing. 
This again means that a pure thought about a thing, »detached (abstracted) 
from all the sensory conceptions of a thing, is not separated from the thing, but 
is identical to it« (p. 97). Thus, Hegel also makes concepts into beings, into that 
which really is. And that is actually the fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s 
philosophy. And based on this understanding, it is directly possible, if »we start 
with the most detached (the most abstract) concept« (p. 97), to develop from it 
an uninterrupted sequence of concepts »which in their wholeness and in their 
development will be identical to the wholeness of true beings, and of the true 
Being itself, and to the development of the whole world« (p. 98).
And this is exactly what Marković does not agree with. It is exactly the same, 
only expressed in other words, as what he had claimed towards the end of sec-
tion five, i.e. that Hegel’s logic is »the most elaborate transformation of logic into 
metaphysics«. Indeed, it should be noted that Hegel is completely aware of this. 
Thus, for instance, in his Introduction (Einleitung) to The Science of Logic (Wis-
senschaft der Logik), in the section entitled General Division of the Logic (Allge-
meine Einteilung der Logik) he says the following:11 
»Die objektive Logik tritt damit vielmehr an die Stelle der vormaligen Metaphysik, 
als welche das wissenschaftliche Gebäude über die Welt war, das nur durch Ge-
danken aufgeführt sein sollte.«
Marković, however, strictly distinguishes between logic and metaphysics. 
He wishes to draw a hard border between that which in thinking is (only) 
thought (and does not really need to be) and that which really is. He insists on a 
clear distinction between that which belongs to the thinking – be it a thought, 
or an idea, and the like – from the (individual) being.
11 I quote all Hegel’s works according to the edition Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Werke in 
zwanzig Bänden, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. In this edition, The Science of Logic 
was published in two volumes (Wissenschaft der Logik I and Wissenschaft der Logik II) in 1969, 
i.e. Vol. 5. Erster Teil: Die objektive Logik: Erstes Buch, and Vol. 6. Erster Teil: Die objektive 
Logik: Zweites Buch; Zweiter Teil: Die subjektive Logik. The abovementioned quote is from Wis-
senschaft der Logik I (61). Cf. also the English translation by George di Giovanni (The Science of 
Logic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 42).
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In this way, Marković opened space for himself, that is, he found »a place in 
the system«, and thus obtained a stronghold from where to begin a real critique 
of Hegel’s logic. This critique is condensed in two fundamental objections:
1. It is not possible, from one (most abstract) concept, which would be the 
beginning of all other concepts, to develop a totality of concepts (and, 
at the same time, the totality of everything there is) without the aid of 
sensory conceptions.
2. The procedure of absolute logic is »illogical« in itself, i.e. contrary to the 
irrefutable laws of logic.
Marković mostly dwells on Hegel’s objective logic, which is understandable, 
since it is precisely here that the »transformation of logic into metaphysics« is 
most clearly manifested.
2. The »planting« of sense perception
Marković starts his critique of Hegel with an analysis of entirely simple, ex-
istential judgments, such as »God is«, »man is«. These »existential judgments«, 
i.e. »existencijni« (or, existence’s), as Marković calls them, claim only the Being 
of the subject. The only judgments simpler than these are the »subjectless judg-
ments« or (»subjectless sentences«), such as »grmi« (literally, »[it] thunders«, Ger. 
es donnert), which assert only the Being of this sensation, that is, just »the feeling 
of thunder«. If, however, all the subjects are removed from »existential« judg-
ments, only the predicate (»is«) remains, asserting Being. And this is the simplest 
concept, the concept of Being, for if we were to remove this concept as well, there 
would be nothing left. This is why, according to Marković, Hegel starts from this 
concept in The Science of Logic, i.e. from the concept of Being, which, after it has 
been abstracted from all subjects, is actually the pure Being itself (hence not only 
the concept of Being, but to be itself).
However, since all subjects have been removed from this concept of pure 
Being (also from Being itself), which means they have all been negated, this 
concept of pure Being is simultaneously pure (or the most complete) negation, 
hence pure nothing. In this place, Marković quotes the well-known passage 
from Hegel’s The Science of Logic, namely »das reine Sein und das reine Nichts 
ist dasselbe« (p. 100).12 Thereby, in order to grasp Hegel’s understanding of 
logic, it is essential to notice that this first, initial concept develops from itself, 
so to say »demands« that second concept. And, as Marković thinks, since these 
two concepts are, consistent with their substance, »identical«, they, in his opin-
12 The sentence is actually worded as follows (Wissenschaft der Logik I, 83): »Das reine Sein und 
das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe.« Cf. also the English translation (The Science of Logic, 59).
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ion, »unite« into a new, third concept, the concept of being in existence, or the 
concept of becoming (das Werden). In attempting to explain it more closely, 
Marković says that »becoming brings together and unites the Being with the 
non-Being« (p. 100), and provides an example for it (p. 100): »[...] as the day 
breaks (becomes day), it is not yet, but it already is; its becoming represents the 
gradual transition from non-Being to Being, or the merging of non-Being with 
Being.«
For Marković, the most controversial concept in this »triad« is the third 
concept, i.e. becoming. This is because he maintains that this third concept 
cannot be deduced from the previous two by means of pure thinking, without 
the aid of sense perception. In other words, it is not true that the concept of 
becoming (and, consequently, the becoming itself) »arises« from the concept 
of pure Being and from the concept of pure non-Being. This would mean that 
there is a certain »arbitrariness« involved in Hegel, if not a sort of »conceal-
ment«. Marković expresses it in the following way (p. 101): 
»The concept of becoming has been discovered (reached) through sense percep-
tion of real changeable phenomenal things, and it is from there stealthily added 
to pure Being and non-Being, and it is not figured out by pure thinking itself«. 
Moreover, it is actually a matter of »planting«.
Thus, it is already in the first »triad« that the third concept is contestable, 
precisely because pure thinking is powerless: thinking alone, without the help 
of experience, i.e. without perception, cannot reach that third concept. But this, 
Marković believes, recurs further on, too, »throughout all the development of the 
concepts of absolute logic« (p. 102), since such is Hegel’s »methodological proce-
dure«, which is, in fact, threefold: »first there is an assertion (position), then its 
denial (negation), and, after that, for the sake of the internal sameness of denial 
and assertion, the composition (synthesis) of both into the third affirmative con-
cept» (p. 103). It should be noted that the adjective ječan is used here by Marković 
in the sense of »affirmative«, »positive« (in Croatian usually potvrdan, jestan). 
This is, indeed, one of the key words in Marković’s Logic, as well as the noun jek.
Thus, Hegel’s well-known three-part sequence in dialectics, i.e. thesis (affir-
mation) – antithesis (negation of affirmation) – synthesis (negation of negation), 
according to Marković, would be: jek – nijek – sastav (which is a recurring jek).
Having shown the controversy of the third concept, Marković, so to say, re-
verses his proof. In other words, not only is the third concept reached, or ob-
tained, by means of experience, i.e. on the basis of the perception of reality, but 
the second, too, i.e. negation, is reached in the same way, and so is the first con-
cept, i.e. affirmation.
Finally, Marković specifically discusses two »movers« in Hegel’s method, as 
he calls them, i.e. negation and identity or sameness, of which only the first will 
be considered here.
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2.1. What kind of negation appears in Hegel’s thinking procedure?
In order to demonstrate »the power of negation« (p. 108) in Hegel’s logic, 
Marković considers these two examples: the concept of Something (German 
Etwas; Marković uses the form nješto, nječega in Croatian), and the relation 
between spirit and nature. Something is, Marković says, »an indeterminate 
singularity«, or »an indeterminate single unit« (p. 106). The question is raised 
about how Something further develops, say, a circle, which is such a Something, 
and is also Something that is affirmative. Since every Something, including the 
mentioned circle, is a certain singularity, that means it has limits, actually its 
Being has limits, which, in the case of the circle, is its circumference. Although 
a limit is a negation of the Being of Something, and in this case the circumfer-
ence is the negation of the Being of the circle, that limit, i.e. the circumference, 
nevertheless still belongs to the very substance of the circle. This, on the other 
hand, means that the Being of the circle receives in itself its own negation. 
Marković calls the Being of Something within its limits – samòbitak, i.e. Being-
in-itself (German Ansichsein), whereas he calls the Being outside its limits – in-
òbitak, i.e. Being-for-other (German Anderssein). Consequently, Being-in-itself 
receives (its own) Being-for-other, which again means that the Being-in-itself 
and the Being-for-other identify with each other and merge, and thus a certain 
determinate Something develops its own Being-for-other from its Being-in-
itself, i.e. it changes. Therefore, every Something, since it is singular and thus 
limited, is also changeable. Marković concludes this derivation of his own in 
the following way (p. 107): 
»Thus Hegel has, by means of pure-thought development of pure concepts alone, 
regardless of the real world, obtained a living world-ruling concept of continuous 
change: every Something or everything changes (‘πάντα ῥεῖ’ in Heraclitus)«.
Still, it should be noted that in the quoted passage Marković states only 
one side of this »dialectics« of the Something and the Other, which »occurs« 
on their limit. However, the concept of limit is rather more complicated in 
Hegel. Since the limit is not only the non-Being of Something, in the sense that 
Something (i.e. the Being of Something) receives into itself its own negation, 
but it is also the non-Being of this Other, which means that, with it, the Other 
(i.e. the Being of the Other) takes its own negation into itself (since the Other is 
a certain Something, too), and with this (the first) Something is maintained as 
exactly itself. Hegel, in fact, puts it in the following way:13
»Etwas also ist unmittelbares sich auf sich beziehendes Dasein und hat eine 
Grenze zunächst als gegen Anderes: sie ist das Nichtsein des Anderen, nicht 
des Etwas selbst; es begrenzt in ihr sein Anderes. – Aber das Andere ist selbst 
13 See Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, 136. Cf. also the English translation (The Science of Logic, 
98-99).
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ein Etwas überhaupt; die Grenze also, welche das Etwas gegen das Andere hat, 
ist auch Grenze des Anderen als Etwas, Grenze desselben, wodurch es das erste 
Etwas als sein Anderes von sich abhält, oder ist ein Nichtsein jenes Etwas; so ist 
sie nicht nur Nichtsein des Anderen, sondern des einen wie des anderen Etwas, 
somit des Etwas überhaupt.«
However, Marković does as explained, that is, states only one side of the men-
tioned »dialectics«, because he finds it crucial to demonstrate that Hegel »in-
volves« spatial relations into pure thought. This is even more evident when he 
considers another example of negation, when he takes Hegel’s famous antithesis 
of spirit and nature. According to Hegel, as Marković states, »spirit is the nega-
tion of nature« (p. 110). That which for Hegel really is, which is ὄντως ὄν, is exclu-
sively the thought, or the concept. Nevertheless, nature also is, hence it »has« 
Being, since nature is also thought, or concept, only without knowing it. Thus, 
nature is »self-less (out-of-itself), conscious-less thought, conscious-less concept« 
(p. 108). But thought cannot be »out-of-itself«, since it is always »in itself«, and, 
is inasmuch, »at-itself«, or »in-itself«. This is why, in nature, a tendency can be 
observed that it would also »come to itself«, i.e. that it would become »at-itself«, 
or »in-itself«. And this is exactly what gravity is: the tendency of nature to remove 
its spatiality, its extensibility, or, as Marković says, its »extensibleness« and to ar-
rive to itself, i.e. reach its own centre. This centre is actually a mathematical point, 
which means a total negation of nature, namely of its spatiality, or »extensible-
ness«. If nature were to succeed in this, it would cease being nature, but it cannot, 
it is just not able to do it, so to say, in nature, but only in the human spirit (or in 
the human mind).14 In other words, »the human spirit is nature collected in itself, 
or come-to-itself« (p. 109).
But since the spirit is the negation of nature, Marković poses the question of 
what kind of negation it is: a contradictory negation, such as white vs. non-white, 
or a contrary negation, such as black vs. white. Upon that, he offers an answer, 
in fact, that from Hegel’s viewpoint it is not a contradictory negation, as such a 
negation would completely eliminate nature, totally deny it, but that it is actually 
a case of contrary negation, which, instead of nature, states something higher, 
and that something higher which is affirmative, i.e. itself.
And now there follows the key question (p. 110): »[...] where does absolute logic 
obtain that which is affirmative (positive) in the concept of spirit?« Marković’s 
answer is »from observing spatial differences«, hence from experience. This, in 
Marković’s opinion, can be seen precisely in the prepositions izvan, pri and u (i.e. 
out of, at and in), as those prepositions used as parts of the words izvanseban, 
priseban i useban actually indicate the mentioned antithesis: nature is izvanseb-
14 Cf. the English title The Phenomenology of Mind, as Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes was 
translated by Sir James Black Baillie [Mineoloa, New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 2003; 
originally: Macmillan Company, London and New York, 1931 (first publication: 1910)].
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na (out-of-itself ), whereas spirit is priseban (at-itself ), or useban (in-itself ). Here 
again, »planting« is in place.
By contemplating the different meanings of the abovementioned preposi-
tions, Marković points to one more thing. Since nature is spatial, i.e. it extends, 
its contrary negation would also need to be something spatial, ergo extensible, or 
it would have to be in the area of spatiality, just as the opposite of white would 
have to be another colour. But when, speaking of the spirit, we say it is useban (in-
itself ), Marković claims we say it exclusively metaphorically, as the spirit really is 
not spatial. It is just said so, in a certain analogy in relation to nature. It could be 
added that it is only a matter of particular language use. But this means again that 
this is not a contrary negation, as it might seem at first in Hegel’s »methodologi-
cal approach«, but a contradictory negation: the spirit is not contrary to nature, 
but it is its contradiction. The spirit, according to Marković, cannot be brought 
into connection with nature at all.
Thus, however we understand negation in Hegel’s logic (and this means in 
Hegel’s philosophy in general), in both cases logic itself stops, becomes paralysed, 
and this occurs either in the third step, if we suppose that the negation is contra-
dictory, or already in the second step, if we suppose that the negation is contrary. 
However, in this case, perception comes to the rescue; or, better said, in this case, 
logic uses it stealthily.
3. The »illogicality« of absolute logic
But absolute logic is at the same time also completely »illogical«, i.e. its 
procedure is not in agreement with logic, and that is so because, as Marković 
states, »it makes those mistakes in making inferences, which are called paralo-
gisms« (p. 116). Hence, absolute logic is erroneous, i.e. Hegel makes mistakes in 
inferencing, and it would be better to say that, during the process of inferenc-
ing, he does not respect the laws of logic, already set, as Marković says, by Ar-
istotle, and all the philosophers so far recognise them, »only Hegel’s absolute 
logic does not recognise and intentionally offends those laws« (p. 116). In order 
to demonstrate how much absolute logic, i.e. Hegel himself, »offends« the laws 
of logic, Marković considers the second figure of the categorical syllogism, and 




Then, Marković also recounts the rules that are valid especially for this fig-
ure and explains (p. 116): 
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»[...] in the second syllogistic figure the conclusion is always negative, while one 
premise is negative and the other one affirmative. The second syllogistic figure 
can never yield an affirmative conclusion«. 
Of course, these are the rules that can easily be derived from the general 
rules for a valid syllogism. It is known that in the syllogism the middle concept 
must at least in one premise be distributed, i.e. thought of in its full extension. 
Since in the second figure the middle concept is put in the place of the predi-
cate, this means that at least one premise must be negative, so that this middle 
concept could be distributed. And if one premise is negative, again, according 
to the general rules for a valid syllogism, the conclusion must be negative, too.
However, it is precisely against these rules that Hegel errs, because he uses 
the second figure of the categorical syllogism to derive affirmative conclusions, 
and does so using two affirmative premises. Marković also exemplifies this (p. 
117):
1. Pure Being is the emptiest (the most abstract) concept;
2. Nothing is the emptiest concept;
3. Therefore: Nothing is pure Being, and the other way around: pure Being 
is nothing.
Of course, Marković adds, Hegel is completely aware of those (his) paralo-
gisms, those erroneous inferences, but he claims »that these laws are outdated 
and that they have no value« (p. 117). Despite this standpoint, Marković arrives 
at the conclusion that these laws still do have value, because, besides the fact 
that everyone, from Aristotle to Mill, agrees about this, it is also confirmed 
by the »natural intellect of every man« (p. 117). Having considered several ad-
ditional examples of such (erroneous) inferencing, Marković finishes this sixth 
section, leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside, persuaded that he has offered sufficient 
evidence that the procedure of absolute logic is »illogical« in itself, and finally 
returns to the systematic development of his own logic.
Conclusion
Now, Marković »leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside«, and perhaps it would be 
better to say »leaves Hegel’s philosophy aside with noticeable relief«, because 
it should be noted that in the whole of the sixth section, which is dedicated 
to a critique of Hegel’s logic, Marković’s certain »resistance« to Hegel can be 
sensed, not only to »absolute logic«, but also to Hegel’s philosophy as a whole; 
or, as he himself says, to this »transformation of logic into metaphysics«.
But this is exactly what Hegel’s philosophy is, this »transformation«, namely 
that logic is actually metaphysics. As we have seen, this is what Marković can-
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not accept at all. In this, he completely belongs to anti-Hegelianism, which is 
one of the fundamental characteristics of »Austrian realism«, the philosophy 
of the time, which gradually develops in the second half of the 19th century, say, 
on the line Prague – Vienna – Graz – Zagreb, and whose central personality is 
Franz Brentano. This position was, however, conceived earlier, in the first half 
of the 19th century, in the extraordinarily important works of the great Bernard 
Bolzano.
This might probably be the reason, namely the abovementioned »resis-
tance« to Hegel, that Marković, in his critique of some of Hegel’s theses, does 
not always take into account the entirety of Hegel’s derivation, but rather, 
from time to time, explicates only one »side«, or one »aspect« of this entirety, 
as, for example, when he interprets the »dialectics« of Something and of the 
Other, which takes place on their limit, as explained above. And yet, Hegel 
claims »Das Wahre ist das Ganze«, in Phänomenologie des Geistes.15 Marković, 
of course, knows that, but, it seems, he deliberately approaches that »logic 
which is transformed into metaphysics« only from the logical perspective, and 
not, simultaneously, also from the metaphysical perspective. In other words, 
Marković criticises the book entitled Wissenschaft der Logik exclusively logi-
cally, and expresses his objections only from that standpoint. He refuses to 
accept that this is actually metaphysics. It is, however, important to understand 
that, despite everything, Marković is fully aware that he needs to (philosophi-
cally) »position« himself in relation to Hegel, in any case in relation to his logic, 
and also to his philosophy in its entirety.
Such an approach to the history of philosophy distinguishes Marković from 
many opponents of Hegel’s philosophising, hence from many anti-Hegelians, 
who, as it often happens, do not wish to deal with Hegel’s philosophy at all. Fi-
nally, this is, among other things, of course, what makes Marković one of the fun-
damental philosophers in recent Croatian philosophy (»recent« meaning here: in 
Croatian philosophy written in Croatian); this is what makes him the philosopher 
from whom this »recent« philosophy begins.
15 See Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 24 (Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Vol. 3, 1970).
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Markovićeva kritika Hegelove logike
Sažetak
Rukopisna Logika Franje pl. Markovića (1845.–1914.), prvoga profesora filozo-
fije na obnovljenome Zagrebačkome sveučilištu (1874.), čuva se u Arhivu Hr-
vatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Zagrebu, i to autograf pod oznakom 
XV 37/1, a pod oznakom XV 37/2 šest litografiranih primjeraka (a–f ), od kojih 
je najopsežniji onaj s oznakom 2a (obuhvaća oko 820 stranica). Rukopis se Lo-
gike, grubo uzevši, sastoji od dvaju dijelova: prvi je uvodni, a drugomu je naslov 
Sustav logike. Prvi se dio potom dijeli na sedam, a drugi dio na jedanaest odsje-
ka. U članku se razmatra šesti odsjek prvoga (uvodnoga) dijela pod naslovom 
Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici (u primjerku 2a str. 94–119), u kojem Marković 
iznosi svoju kritike Hegelove logike. Pri tome se najprije opisuje sam rukopis 
Logike, a potom se raspravlja o dvama osnovnim Markovićevim prigovorima 
Hegelu: prvo, da nije moguće iz jednoga (najapstraktnijega) pojma, koji bi bio 
početak svih ostalih pojmova, razviti sveukupnost pojmova (te ujedno sveuku-
pnost cjeline svega što jest) bez pomoći opažajnih pomisli; i drugo, da je postu-
pak apsolutne logike sam u sebi »nelogičan«, tj. protivan neoborivim zakonima 
logike. Na kraju se zaključuje da Marković Hegelovu logiku, koja je zapravo 
metafizika, kritizira isključivo iz logičkoga obzora, jer ne prihvaća »pretvorbu« 
logike u metafiziku. Posebno se ističe Markovićeva namjera da se (filozofski) 
»odredi« prema Hegelu, jer se mnogi protivnici Hegelova filozofiranja, kojima i 
sam pripada, uglavnom nerado bave Hegelovom filozofijom.
Ključne riječi: Franjo Marković, logika, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, pro-
tuhegelovstvo, austrijski realizam.
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